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What is the world made of, and how do we fit into it? If it is made out 
of something, then are there many things or is there really just one thing, 
of which everything else is derivative? Philosophical questions about the 
nature of matter did not begin with the Scientific Revolution, nor with the 
advent of modern philosophy. In fact, in seeking to make sense of modern 
theories like quantum mechanics, both pioneering physicists, like Werner 
Heisenberg, and leading philosophers of science, like Nancy Cartwright, 
have found themselves reaching as far back as the metaphysics of Aristotle 
for inspiration, whose philosophy was shaped in turn by Plato and the 
pre-Socratics.
In this chapter, I shall argue that the existence of quantum entanglement 
and the phenomenon of emergence in finite temperature quantum systems 
have called into question the microphysicalist conception of nature that 
dominated the landscape of modern philosophy, in which the world of 
ordinary experience was reducible to a spatiotemporal arrangement of 
microscopic constituents. I shall further argue that they have opened a 
path toward a non-reductive conception of nature familiar to medieval 
theologians like Thomas Aquinas, in which many of the objects of ordi-
nary experience possess ‘forms’ that determine their natures.
Although the philosophy of the Middle Ages was far from monolithic, 
medieval metaphysics from the thirteenth century can be broadly charac-
terised within the Latin tradition by its explicit commitment to Aristotle’s 
hylomorphic analysis of substances in terms of ‘matter’ (hyle) and ‘form’ 
(morphe).1 Whilst strict demarcations between medieval and early mod-
ern philosophy are increasingly discouraged by historians of philosophy, 
the widespread rejection of form as the determining principle of matter,2 
led by the early modern philosophers René Descartes and John Locke, 
is nonetheless a striking discontinuity between medieval and modern 
notions of the natural order. The abandonment of Aristotle’s hylomorphic 
doctrine of substances laid the foundation for a microphysicalist concep-
tion of nature in which the whole of reality is reducible to some set of 
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microscopic constituents whose physical properties are arranged accord-
ing to universal laws. Indeed, the rise of microphysicalism has sometimes 
been presented as one of the lasting and inevitable triumphs of modern 
science, in which an opaque medieval philosophy was forced into retreat 
by a more perspicuous account of nature committed solely to the existence 
of properties which can be measured.
I aim to put such hackneyed claims into question by raising doubts 
about the compatibility of microphysicalism with contemporary physics 
and by drawing upon the doctrine of hylomorphism to make sense of 
physical phenomena at certain points where a dogmatic commitment to 
microphysicalism may be inhibiting understanding.3 Just as Aristotle’s 
conception of causal powers has recently been reclaimed in contemporary 
philosophy, I shall argue, hylomorphism is ripe for rehabilitation. The 
discussion is divided into the following sections.
In Section 2, I consider Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, as it was 
interpreted by Aquinas, and suggest that the widespread rejection of sub-
stantial form was partly the consequence of a ‘physicalisation’ of hylo-
morphism in which matter came to be seen as having physical properties 
independently of substantial form, combined with a faith in the explana-
tory power of microphysical reductionism which contemporary science no 
longer supports. In Section 3, I argue that the phenomenon of quantum 
entanglement gives us good reason to question whether microphysical sys-
tems have intrinsic physical properties, and I sketch my recent neo-Aris-
totelian account of the de Broglie-Bohm version of quantum mechanics in 
which substantial form plays a fundamental role in grounding the physical 
properties of particles. In this metaphysical model, the only fundamental 
physical entity is the cosmos. In Section 4, I argue that the phenomenon 
of emergence in finite temperature quantum systems gives us good reason 
to doubt whether the world is a single, closed quantum system whose 
behaviour can be understood in terms of universal laws. I offer a hylomor-
phic account of the ‘contextual wave function collapse’ theory of quantum 
mechanics put forward by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis, 
for whom the evolution of quantum systems is open to their ‘classical’ 
environments and subject to local, macroscopic boundary conditions. In 
this alternative metaphysical model, there are a plurality of substantial 
forms which determine the natures of different ‘thermal substances’.
2. Matter Physicalised
2.1. Modern Microphysicalism
The writer and lay-theologian, C. S. Lewis, who held the chair of Medi-
aeval and Renaissance Literature at Magdalene College, Cambridge, 
described the highest achievements of the Middle Ages as the ‘medieval 
synthesis itself, the whole organisation of their theology, science, and 
From Quantum Physics to Metaphysics 23
history into a single, complex, harmonious mental model’ (Lewis, 1964, 
p. 11). The medieval mind had a genius for developing systems in which 
‘highly original and soaring philosophical speculation squeezes itself into 
a rigid dialectical pattern copied from Aristotle’ (p. 10).
Modern philosophy, in contrast, has typically adopted a more piece-
meal approach to reality. Among analytic philosophers, the question of 
how human beings fit into the world, for example, is sometimes framed 
(ironically) in the following way: when God made the physical world, 
did he have to add anything in order for there to be human agents, who 
(apparently) have causal powers to act in pursuit of their various purposes 
and goals? Under these rules, the aim of the game for philosophers of 
mind, or theologians, or anybody whose subject matter is deemed less 
respectable than physics, is to relate those things that they want to talk 
about to the fundamental physical facts, without helping themselves, 
ontologically speaking, to anything more than is strictly necessary.
According to David Lewis – a leading analytic philosopher of the last 
century and a staunch microphysicalist – the answer to this ontological 
question is a decided negative:
all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular 
fact, just one little thing and then another . . . We have geometry: 
a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distances between 
points . . . And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natu-
ral intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at 
which to be instantiated. For short, we have an arrangement of quali-
ties. And that is all.
(Lewis, 1986, p. ix)
For the modern disciple of David Hume, who denied any necessary 
connections between the properties of things and the causal powers we 
happen to associate with them, the law-like way in which the world 
appears to be organised reflects nothing more than a human habitus for 
systematisation. According to David Lewis, the sparse natural properties 
picked out by our best physics are related within a ‘best system’, in which 
a law of nature is simply a ‘contingent generalization that appears as a 
theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieve a 
best combination of simplicity and strength’ (Lewis, 1973, p. 73). Since 
dispositions are to be worked out in terms of counterfactuals that depend 
upon the truth of physical laws, and laws are contingent regularities in the 
spatiotemporal distribution of sparse natural properties, a neo-Humean 
microphysicalist, such as Lewis, is committed to the following claim:
Proposition 2.1. The whole truth about nature supervenes upon 
the intrinsic physical properties of (and spatiotemporal relations 
between) some set of fundamental microphysical constituents.
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Yet Humeanism is now on the defensive in academic philosophy: the Aris-
totelian notion that things have ‘powers’ to bring about necessary change 
was reintroduced within mainstream analytic philosophy by Rom Harré 
and E. H. Madden (Harré and Madden, 1973). The concept of causal 
powers was further developed by George Molnar in the 1990s (Molnar, 
2006), and has recently become the foundation of a non-Humean theory 
of causation put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum 
(Mumford and Anjum, 2011).4 It has been championed in the philosophy 
of mind by John Heil and C. B. Martin (Heil, 2003; Heil, 2012; Martin, 
2007) and advanced in the philosophy of science by Brian Ellis and Alex-
ander Bird (Ellis, 2001; Bird, 2007), among others.5
A world with powers is a world in which entities have fundamental 
agency, since causal powers are features of reality that bring about change 
by natural necessity, and they are irreducible to ‘categorical’ properties 
which make no reference to change. The case for reconceiving natural 
properties as having (or being) causal powers, however, has done little 
to extend the fundamentally real domain beyond the microphysical to 
include macroscopic agents such as human beings.
Analytic theologians have typically found microphysicalist accounts 
of nature too sparse for articulating a theological anthropology, whether 
or not they admit causal powers. Something more is often supposed 
to be needed in order to get the facts right about human persons as 
purposive and responsible agents, created in imago dei. Yet whatever 
these extra-physical entities are taken to be – whether they’re Cartesian 
souls which somehow act upon physical bodies or mental properties 
which are somehow distinct from physical properties – our ‘best phys-
ics’ is still widely supposed to provide a unified account of the material 
world in terms of microphysical properties that can be measured and 
manipulated. The quandary which confronts those who are tempted 
to add something non-physical to this picture of nature, however, is 
whether the microphysical description of reality that they are seeking 
to augment should be regarded as ‘causally closed’. This is the kind 
of tribute that modern philosophers are generally expected to pay for 
the triumph of scientific empiricism and reductive simplicity over the 
kind of rationalism and ontological extravagance exhibited by ancient 
philosophers like Plato, for whom the truth about nature was a matter 
of armchair speculation.
2.2. The Doctrine of Hylomorphism
It would be caricature, however, to portray every ancient and medieval 
philosopher as being insensitive to the role of empirical investigation in 
finding out about nature. Although Aristotle was famously the protégé 
of Plato, and both philosophers aspired to universal truths about real-
ity, including the truth about human souls, it is widely acknowledged 
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by scholars of ancient philosophy that these great thinkers of antiquity 
diverged in their methodology and their metaphysics.6
For Plato, reality lay beyond our experience of the world of concrete 
physical things in a transcendent realm of universals that he called the 
‘forms’, which somehow cause the plurality of particulars with which we 
are acquainted – or which serve as the mental templates by which ‘the 
Demiurge’ moulds the world’s matter – and in which these particulars 
are said to ‘participate’. A form is the universal essence which bestows 
qualitative similarity upon particular things – such as the form of the 
triangle, or the form of man – and can only be known through a kind 
of philosophical recollection (see e.g. [Plato, Meno, 71–81, 85–86]).7 In 
his treatise On Generation and Corruption, however, Aristotle criticised 
Plato’s treatment of the forms on the grounds that, since they are tran-
scendent entities, they cannot function as efficient causes in the physical 
world, and it is implausible that embodied beings such as ourselves could 
ever come to know them (Aristotle, Gen. & Corr., 335b, 18–24). If the 
forms are to explain the characteristic activities of concrete particulars, 
they must be immanent within the physical world, and embodied beings 
must come to know them by causally interacting with the substances that 
they are said to ‘in-form’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics III, 34). It is substances, 
not forms, that act as efficient causes in nature. For Aristotle, ontological 
commitment is guided by the Eleatic principle:8
Proposition 2.2. A thing exists just in case that thing has the causal 
power to affect and/or to be affected, to bring about change and/
or to suffer change.
Whilst the ontological status of the forms in Aristotle’s metaphysics is 
still vigorously debated, Aristotle maintained a robust commitment to the 
concrete reality of in-formed substances, which are fundamental wholes 
whose causal powers are irreducible to the powers of their material parts. 
His broadly empirical stance is manifest in his systematic study of natural 
phenomena and his indefatigable classification of substances into natural 
kinds. For Aristotle, philosophical inquiry began with the study of nature 
as it presents itself in ordinary experience, proceeding to more abstract 
reflections upon the nature of time and change (in the Physics), and thence 
to fundamental questions about the nature of being (in the Metaphysics). 
For these reasons, I suggest, it is not unreasonable to consider Aristotle 
as a kind of proto-scientist who inaugurated the empirical tradition of 
scientific inquiry – a tradition characterised by a remarkable confidence in 
the powers of reason and observation to uncover the truths about nature.
To understand Aristotle’s philosophical account of nature, we must 
begin with the reality of change in the natural world. Aristotle distin-
guished two ways of being in his account of change: there is being-in-
potency (or potentiality) and there is being-in-act (or actuality) (see 
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[Aristotle, Physics, I.7]).9 According to Aristotle,10 the natural order is 
fundamentally composed of substances, which are concrete particulars 
which have the potential to change in various ways. For example, ani-
mals are organic substances which actualise their potential for gathering 
flesh by exercising their powers of growth and nutrition.11 Yet organic 
substances cannot persist through all kinds of change but are transitory 
entities, which are subject to processes of death and decay. Aristotle intro-
duced the co-relative concepts of matter (hyle) and form (morphe) in 
his account of how substances change (see e.g. [Aristotle, Physics, II.3]). 
Matter is that which changes and gets determined (or actualised), and 
form is that which determines (or actualises) matter. Both metaphysical 
principles are required to explain the changes that we observe in ordinary 
experience, along with the concept of privation, which is the lack of the 
form that is required by whatever the goal of the change happens to be.
For instance, when an animal consumes a plant, by exercising its pow-
ers of growth and nutrition, it transforms the matter of the plant into 
its own flesh. In so doing, the substance of the animal is a subject of 
change: by gathering flesh where there was previously a privation, the 
matter of this substance is determined by a different accidental form. In 
being consumed by the animal, the matter of the plant is also a subject of 
change: by being transformed into the flesh of the animal, the matter of 
the plant is stripped of powers that are essential to the nature of the plant 
and acquires powers that are essential to the nature of the animal. In this 
case, it is the matter underlying the substances of the plant and the animal 
which is said to be determined (or actualised) by the substantial form of 
the animal, since the animal now exists where its form was previously in 
privation.
Aristotelian substances have a per se unity which other kinds of entities 
lack. In order to distinguish an Aristotelian substance, like an animal, 
from an aggregate, like a pile of sand, we must distinguish between actual 
and potential parts. An aggregate is composed of actual parts that have 
their own determinate physical natures. These parts can exist indepen-
dently of the wholes of which they are parts, and they retain their natures 
and identities even whilst they are composing them. They are separate 
actualities which can be analysed in terms of matter and form. An aggre-
gate derives its nature and being from the sum of its actual parts.
An Aristotelian substance, by contrast, does not consist of actual physi-
cal parts into which it can be decomposed. Rather, all the physical parts 
of a substance are dependent for their physical natures upon the substan-
tial whole of which they are part, whose physical existence depends on 
the action of a substantial form. Whilst a living substance, such as an 
animal, can decompose into a collection of non-living chemicals, which 
do not depend upon the original substance for their existence or their 
physical natures, these physical entities are not numerically identical to 
any of the parts of the substance that existed prior to its decomposition. 
From Quantum Physics to Metaphysics 27
The separate physical entities into which a substance may decompose are 
said to exist only in potential, just so long as the substance itself exists.12 
The metaphysical unity of the substance pertains to its having a single 
nature, upon which the natures of all of the parts of the substance jointly 
depend. It is the metaphysical unity of the substance that distinguishes it 
from an aggregate.13
According to a traditional line of interpretation that is often attributed 
to Aquinas, substantial form is both the principle of unity of a substance 
and that by which substances are fundamentally and objectively what 
they are (Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, 5, 30). For Aquinas, whilst a 
substantial form is not a physical part of a substance, a substantial form 
may be said to unite itself to the matter of a substance in virtue of being 
the formal cause of its nature (Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, 6). Matter 
and form, on this account, may be thought of as metaphysical parts of a 
substance.14 The matter which is in-formed by the substantial form of the 
substance is the prime matter underlying all substances, which is the very 
potentiality for substantial being. These ‘metaphysical parts’ cannot be 
physically isolated by manipulating the entity in a scientific experiment 
but can only be separated by metaphysical abstraction, which is a purely 
intellectual process. Without form as well as matter, a physical substance 
would be incomplete.
Aquinas considered the world to be carved into a plurality of sub-
stances with different natures: among the world of inorganic substances, 
he distinguishes various minerals and metals; among the world of organic 
substances, he admits a hierarchy of plants, animals, and people, accord-
ing to their various powers. Animals have powers of perception and 
locomotion (as well as various passions) that plants do not, and humans 
have rational or intellectual powers that other animals do not. Since all 
of these substances are subject to generation and corruption, however, 
and neither arise out of nor disappear into nothingness, we require an 
explanation of substantial change. According to Aquinas’s interpretation 
of Aristotle, the fact that there are substances in the world with different 
powers, which are not simply aggregates of more fundamental physical 
parts, is explained by the existence of different substantial forms, which 
determine the prime matter underlying all substances in different ways 
(Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, 5). This interpretation of hylomorphism 
is thus committed to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. The physical parts of a (macroscopic) substance do 
not have microphysical properties independently of the substances 
of which they are part.
This proposition contradicts the claim that the whole truth about nature – 
including the truth about plants, animals, and people – supervenes upon 
an arrangement of microscopic properties (2.1). According to Aristotle 
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and Aquinas, many of the objects of ordinary experience are substances 
which are irreducible to their parts, including biological agents like human 
beings. So why was this metaphysical account abandoned in favour of 
microphysical reductionism?
2.3. Matter and Form in Late Scholasticism
Whilst the concepts of matter and form were widely deployed in scholastic 
metaphysics in accounting for the nature and unity of substances, these 
doctrines were developed by some scholastic philosophers in ways that 
were incompatible with the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of hylo-
morphism. No single systematic view characterises the scholastic period. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to pick out some suggestive tendencies within 
medieval metaphysics that served as a prelude to microphysicalism.15 I 
shall use the term physicalise to refer to the tendency to treat the matter 
of a substance as having the same ontological standing as the substance 
by attributing to matter intrinsic properties or causal powers.16
The necessity of some material substrate underlying all forms of change 
was widely accepted within the Latin tradition. As Franco Burgersdijk 
observed, ‘all seem to have granted to Aristotle that the generation and 
corruption of natural things requires a common subject’.17 In this way, 
medieval scholastics sought to affirm the continuity of natural processes 
and to avert the supposition that change must involve creation from noth-
ing. However, Aquinas’s characterisation of this substrate as a determin-
able potentiality was widely criticised by other scholastics for failing to 
bottom out in anything concrete or determinate and was never widely 
accepted, even in the thirteenth century. William of Ockham, writing in 
the early fourteenth century, echoed Averroes in requiring that matter 
should have extension.18 Duns Scotus insisted against Aquinas that this 
material substrate should have actual parts.19 The metaphysical misgiv-
ings concerning a merely determinable substrate were starkly expressed 
by the seventeenth-century Ockhamist, André Dabillon, who insisted 
that either ‘the things that compose an actual being actually exist, or a 
substantial whole would be composed of nothing’. Since this position is 
untenable, he claimed that it must be the case that both ‘matter and form 
are real substantial beings that exist actually in nature’.20
In addition to physicalising the material substrate of change, increasing 
its independence from substantial form, some scholastics seem to attribute 
a quasiphysical status to form, suggesting that it interacts with other enti-
ties like an efficient cause. A significant example of this tendency lies in 
the widespread rejection of the so-called unitarian doctrine of substantial 
form.21 In Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism, a substance has a single 
substantial form, which is the principle of unity of the substance and 
determines its nature. For some scholastics, however, such as Scotus, a 
plurality of substantial forms were said to exist within the same substance. 
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For example, the form of corporeity (by which an animal is embodied), 
and the form of the soul (by which an animal is living), were held to be 
present simultaneously within a human substance.
Yet if multiple substantial forms can exist within a substance that simul-
taneously determine its causal powers, wherein lies the unity of the sub-
stance, and how do they determine its properties? For certain scholastics, 
it seems the temptation was to preserve their commitment to the unifying 
character of forms by portraying them as elements within the compos-
ite with powers to organise their various parts into a functional whole. 
Francisco Suárez, a philosopher of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, seems to be considering such a position when he writes,
The aggregation of multiple faculties or accidental forms in a simple 
substantial subject is not enough for the constitution of a natural 
thing .  .  . A form is required that, as it were, rules over all those 
faculties and accidents, and is the source of all actions and natural 
motions of such a being.22
Yet once matter and form have been physicalised, formal and efficient 
causation become difficult to distinguish from one another. For the Aris-
totelian-Thomistic hylomorphist, substances share a substrate of deter-
minable potentiality, which is in-formed one way and then another. For 
certain scholastics, however, substantial forms seem to act directly as effi-
cient causes, since that is the only way in which they can make a difference 
to things that have their own intrinsic and determinate natures.23 Whilst 
the metaphysical roles of matter and form remained the same in inten-
tion, the ways in which their tasks were implemented rapidly shifted from 
their Aristotelian-Thomistic moorings. Matter and form were physicalised 
and formal causation confounded with efficient causation, a circumstance 
that would place substantial forms in direct competition with physical 
mechanisms.
2.4. The Rise of Microphysicalism
The mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century, far from arising 
in a philosophical vacuum, represents a development in these tendencies 
within medieval philosophy, which culminated in the complete physi-
calisation of the material substrate of change, combined with an explicit 
rejection of the notion of substantial forms. Abandoning the hylomor-
phism of late scholasticism, the corpuscularianists proposed an alternative 
ontology consisting of corpuscles arranged within physical space which 
have intrinsic and determinate properties, echoing the atomism of Leu-
cippus and Democritus that Aristotle had so vehemently opposed. In this 
new vision of the world, nature wears all of her properties on her sleeves 
where they are exposed to being measured and manipulated, unlike the 
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metaphysical principles underlying the world in medieval philosophy, 
which are only uncovered through a process of metaphysical abstraction.
Not all of the early mechanists were committed to an ontology of dis-
crete corpuscles. In the mechanical philosophy of Descartes, reality was 
divided between thinking things (res cogitantes) and extended things (res 
extensa), where the extended things are wholly characterised by the geo-
metric properties of ‘shape, size [and] position’ and their motions are 
governed by universal laws. A thoroughgoing reductionist in his approach 
to the material world – which included flora and fauna and the animal 
kingdom but excluded human persons who are immaterial souls – Des-
cartes believed ‘there is nothing in all of nature whose character (ratio) 
cannot be deduced through these same principles’ and dismissed substan-
tial form as ‘a philosophical being unknown to me’.24, 25
It would be difficult to overstate the enduring influence of Descartes’s 
metaphysics, although Cartesian physics was a short-lived affair by con-
trast: Isaac Newton rejected Descartes’s identification of matter with 
extension and proceeded to develop an alternative account of motion that 
would rapidly secure Newtonian mechanics as the archetype of modern 
physics.26 Nonetheless, the common commitment to a physicalised form 
of matter continued to set the agenda for natural philosophers from the 
seventeenth century. Buoyed by swift advances in the experimental sci-
ences, corpuscularianism swiftly supplanted scholasticism in many parts 
of Europe, as scientists like Robert Boyle contrived plausible mechanical 
explanations for natural phenomena, specifically targeting cases in physics 
where scholastics had attributed phenomena to the activities of forms.27 
Henry Oldenburg, who served as the first secretary for the Royal Society, 
memorably complimented Boyle for having ‘driven out that drivel of sub-
stantial forms’ which ‘has stopped the progress of true philosophy, and 
made the best of scholars not more knowing as to the nature of particular 
bodies than the meanest ploughmen’.28
Whilst corpuscularianists maintained a commitment to the notion of 
a material substrate underlying all change – in Boyle’s view, a ‘substance 
extended, divisible, and impenetrable’29 – the doctrine of substantial forms 
was swiftly abandoned during the course of the seventeenth century (albeit 
with some notable dissenters, such as Leibniz (1976)). This extirpation 
of form was accompanied by a different account of the generation and 
corruption of the things we encounter in experience. As Silva observes, 
without forms to determine the intrinsic powers of substances, natural 
philosophers increasingly relied upon ‘laws of nature that extrinsically 
guided the movements of corpuscles and atoms in a void’ to explain how 
things (apparently) come into and out of being (p. 64), and thus ‘intrin-
sic natural formal causes were replaced by extrinsically imposed laws of 
nature’ (Silva, 2019, p. 65).30 According to Boyle, the material world that 
is laid bare by the physical sciences should be regarded as a ‘contrivance 
of brute matter managed by certain laws of local motion’ (Boyle, 2000, 
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vol. 10, p. 447). The matter of which everything is made persists through 
time and only changes with respect to accidents like position.
By the eighteenth century, David Hume had sought to ‘introduce the 
experimental method into moral subjects’, in A Treatise on Human Nature 
(1739–40), laying the foundations for a microphysicalist account of the 
mind, and the French mechanist Pierre Simon de Laplace had given voice 
to a mechanical stance toward the whole of nature that would dominate 
the imagination of philosophers until the turn of the twentieth century. 
According to the new philosophy of nature, the state of the whole cosmos 
at any future time, including human beings, is entirely fixed by the pres-
ent locations and momenta of small particles and the laws of Newtonian 
mechanics.31 The only changes in such a world are the accidental changes 
in the arrangements of the particles. This is the world of ‘classical physics’ 
with which most philosophers are familiar, in which the mechanical laws 
of physics determine all the physical possibilities of nature. It is a causally 
closed world in which substantial forms have no role to play in bringing 
about change.
3. Form in Standard Quantum Mechanics
The confidence of the corpuscularianists in their capacity to explain every-
thing in terms of the properties of material corpuscles, and the animus 
displayed by early philosophers of science like Oldenburg against the 
medieval scholastics, effectively banished the doctrine of hylomorphism 
from mainstream philosophical discourse. Yet the microphysicalism that 
came to dominate the Anglophone philosophical tradition, which eventu-
ally dropped any commitment to corpuscles, has run into difficulties with 
contemporary physics. It is widely accepted, for example, that the theory 
of quantum mechanics, which superseded classical physics, is incompat-
ible with the doctrine of Humean supervenience, as it was formulated 
by Lewis (2.1). As Maudlin has pointed out: the standard doctrine of 
Humean supervenience is inconsistent with the existence of quantum-
entangled states, which are indeterminate states of a physical system that 
cannot be characterised in terms of the intrinsic properties of spatially 
separated microscopic constituents (Bell, 1964; Maudlin, 2007). In what 
follows, I shall discuss this problem and consider how it can be addressed 
by adopting a hylomorphic framework in which matter ontologically 
depends upon form for its physical properties.32
3.1. Quantum Entanglement
The fundamental mathematical object within quantum theory is the 
quantum state, which encodes the probability of an arbitrarily compli-
cated physical system having a particular configuration. In the famous 
EPR experiment involving two microscopic particles originally proposed 
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by Einstein and his collaborators (Einstein et al., 1935), as it was sub-
sequently presented by David Bohm, one particle is constrained to be 
‘spin-up’ |↑〉 when another is measured to be ‘spin-down’ |↓〉, and vice 
versa, however far apart the two particles are spatially separated.33 The 
physical system in this case is said to be in a ‘quantum superposition’ that 
is described by the singlet state:
ψ
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
2,
= ↑ ↓ − ↓ ↑( ) . (1)
According to this formalism, when a system comprised of two particles 
(1 and 2) is in the singlet state ψ
1 2,
: there is a probability of 1/2 that we 
will observe particle 1 to be ‘spin up’ ↑
1
and particle 2 to be ‘spin down’ 
↓
2
; and there is a probability of 1/2 that we will observe particle 1 to 
be ‘spin down’ ↓
1
 and particle 2 to be ‘spin up’ ↑
2
. There are no other 
physically possible outcomes.
3.1.1. Non-Local Correlations
The challenge that such systems pose to the doctrine of Humean super-
venience is the fact that we cannot explain their measurement statistics 
in terms of the local properties of their constituent parts. Suppose two 
quantum-entangled particles that are emitted from a common source fly 
off in opposite directions, and two experimenters (traditionally, ‘Alice’ 
and ‘Bob’) measure the spins of each particle once they are sufficiently 
separated using different measuring devices. Let φA specify the configura-
tion of Alice’s apparatus, and A the outcome of her experiment; likewise, 
φB for Bob’s apparatus, and B for his outcome. Let λ denote whatever in 
the past may have influenced the behaviour of the system that is being 
measured. In this example, λ includes the physical state of the two-particle 
system, prior to measurement. The measuring apparatus in each case is 
a Stern-Gerlach device, in which a pointer has the possibility of being 
deflected up or down, and the configuration parameters are the two angles 
of polarisation of each device, φA and φB. These parameters can be set 
at an appropriate angle for measuring vertical spin (that is, ‘spin-up’ or 
‘spin-down’), but can also be adjusted separately to produce a range of 
measurement outcomes. According to the physicist John Bell (Bell, 1964), 
the principle of locality requires:
P A P A
a b aφ φ φ
λ λ, | |B, ( )= ( )  (2)
P B P B
a b bφ φ φ
λ λ, | |A, ( )= ( ) . (3)
The formalisation of the first equation can be read as follows: if the prin-
ciple of locality is true, then the probability P for Alice obtaining outcome 
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A can be fixed by conditionalising on the configuration of her apparatus 
φA and whatever in the past influenced its behaviour λ, such as the local 
properties of the particle she measures. Significantly, in a world in which 
locality holds and the two measurements are conducted simultaneously, 
conditionalising on the configuration of Bob’s apparatus φB and outcome 
B does not change the probabilities for Alice’s outcome. Hence, the two 
probabilities in the first equation are stated to be equal. This is also the 
case for Bob’s outcome with respect to Alice’s apparatus, hence the equal-
ity of the two probabilities in the second of the two equations.
However, Bell’s theorem demonstrates that the principle of locality 
is violated by the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. According 
to quantum mechanics, the probabilities for obtaining a measurement 
outcome in one part of the experiment depend on the outcome obtained 
in the other part of the experiment, in spite of the fact that the two mea-
surement events are represented as ‘space-like separated’ in the theory of 
special relativity, because they are conducted simultaneously within the 
frame of reference of the experiment.
To visualise the limits on signalling which are imposed by the theory of 
relativity (in this case, between the two wings of the EPR experiment), the 
mathematician Minkowski suggested imagining a flash of light, confined 
to a two-dimensional plane, which spreads out in a circle from an event 
E at some time t (Minkowski, 1908). If we graph the growing circle using 
time as the vertical axis, we obtain a ‘light-cone’ for event E that extends 
to include any past event t´ < t in which a signal could have been sent 
which would have time to reach E and causally influence this event. Any 
event which falls outside of the light-cone of E is ‘space-like separated’ 
from E and cannot be causally related to E by a classical mechanism.34 
Since the measurement events in the two wings of the EPR experiment 
corresponding to A and B do not belong within each other’s past light-
cones, they are space-like separated. In other words, the assumption that 
the behaviour of the particles can be explained by a (subluminal) physical 
mechanism that governs their local properties implies one set of mea-
surement statistics, whereas quantum mechanics predicts another. Signifi-
cantly, in the case of the EPR experiment, quantum mechanics predicts 
that the measurement statistics will depend on the relative angle between 
the two devices, φA – φB; a fact that neither particle, considered separately, 
is in a position to ‘know’.
Whilst the EPR experiment was originally proposed as a thought 
experiment by Albert Einstein and his associates, and was intended as a 
reductio ad absurdum of quantum mechanics, subsequent experiments – 
in particular, those of Alain Aspect in the 1980s (Aspect et al., 1982) – 
are now widely regarded as having confirmed the statistics predicted by 
quantum mechanics and established non-locality as an empirical fact.35 
Contra Laplace, we cannot explain the physical behaviour of everything 
in nature in terms of the mechanical forces between physical bodies and 
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the intrinsic properties of their microscopic constituents. The phenome-
non of quantum entanglement suggests that the mechanical stance toward 
nature which was adopted by the corpuscularianists offers an effective 
description of physical phenomena which holds only at certain scales.
3.1.2. The Measurement Problem
The existence of quantum superpositions, such as the quantum states of 
entangled particles, confronts us with the additional problem of reconcil-
ing the formalism of quantum mechanics with the reality of determinate 
measurement outcomes. Prior to any measurement of a quantum system – 
or any collapse-inducing event, the quantum state evolves according to 








 ,  (4)
where Ĥ  is the Hamiltonian of the system which represents its energy, 
and ħ is the reduced Plank’s constant. The formal solution of Equation 
(4) is the quantum state (or, wave function) ψ t( ) . The quantum state 
can be expressed in terms of an operator Û , such that the state of a sys-
tem at some arbitrary time t can be obtained from its state at some ear-
lier time t = 0 through the action of this operator: ψ ψt U t( ) = ( ) ( )ˆ 0 .36 
This formula tells us how to start from a given state of a system and evolve 
the probability amplitudes for all the possible configurations of the sys-
tem in time. Yet suppose we perform a ‘non-demolition’ measurement on 
the system, which does not destroy the quantum system being measured 
(Dong et al., 2008). After this measurement, we know more about the 
state of the system than the information contained in the quantum state.
For example, the measurement outcome of the EPR experiment will 
have ruled out one of the combined states of the two particles to which 
ψ  assigns a non-zero probability; perhaps the state in which particle 1 
is spin-down and particle 2 is spin-up ψ
1 2 1 2,
= ↓ ↑ . To obtain the cor-
rect results for future experiments, we have to update the wave function 
of the system we are measuring with the empirical knowledge we have 
gained from our experiment. Yet this updating is not performed by the 
time evolution operator Û. For instance, suppose at time t we find that 
particle 1 is spin-up and particle 2 is spin-down: ψ
1 2 1 2,
= ↑ ↓ . The wave 
function has to undergo the following discontinuous modification:
ψ δ δ ψt t U t t−( ) = −( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
0
, ,
ψ δt t+( ) = ↑ ↓
1 2 1 2,
,  (5)
ˆ
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where δt denotes an infinitesimal period of time. This discontinuous 
change in a system’s quantum state is known as the ‘collapse of the wave 
function’, and it is necessary to properly account for any non-demolition 
experiment. There is no agreed understanding of this physical process 
(Omnés, 1994). Even if the phenomenon of decoherence is taken into 
account, in which the quantum nature of the system is said to ‘leak’ into 
its environment, the time evolution operator must be supplemented with 
a discontinuous change in the system’s state. This disconnect between the 
quantum formalism describing the physical state of a system, which can 
only be specified empirically in terms of an indeterminate superposition 
of mutually exclusive measurement outcomes, and the ‘classical’ world 
of observation occupied by scientists, in which measurement always give 
rise to a determinate physical outcome, naturally gives rise to the question 
of why this apparent indefiniteness in the microrealm is not transmitted 
up to the macroworld (as in the notorious ‘Schrödinger’s cat’ thought 
experiment). Is quantum mechanics about an objective world that exists 
independently of scientists and their measurements, or does it merely keep 
track of the state of our knowledge during the course of an experiment?
3.1.3. Matter Without Intrinsic Physical Properties
According to Bell, any realist approach to quantum mechanics that seeks 
to explain the existence of determinate measurement outcomes must 
come to terms with a dilemma: either the dynamics of standard quantum 
mechanics is wrong, and the wave function evolves according to a non-
linear Schrödinger dynamics that permits the wave function to collapse 
independently of the ‘observations’ of any scientist, or there are ‘hid-
den variables’ in addition to the wave function, which evolve according 
to some non-linear dynamics of their own (Bell, 1987). In either case, 
standard quantum mechanics must be regarded as physically incomplete. 
Maudlin has argued that the choice comes down to two possibilities 
(Maudlin, 1995): either we should adopt something like the modified 
Schrödinger dynamics proposed in Ghirardi et al. (1986) (GRW theory), 
in which the wave function undergoes spontaneous collapse, or something 
like the pilot wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm (Bohm, 1951, 1952; 
de Broglie, 1928), which includes an equation of motion for a particle 
configuration.37
The GRW theory seizes the first horn of the dilemma by incorporating a 
stochastic mechanism which produces random ‘hits’ on the wave function 
that occur universally for microscopic particles and result in an objective 
collapse of the wave function (Ghirardi et al., 1986). The effects of this 
non-linear modification to the Schrödinger equation become significant 
when a large number of quantum-entangled particles are involved, such 
as the particles composing a measuring device. The theory of Bohmian 
mechanics seizes the second horn of the dilemma by positing a global 
36 William M. R. Simpson
configuration of particles whose trajectories are choreographed by the 
wave function (Bohm, 1951, 1952; de Broglie, 1928). The guiding equa-
tion for the particles depends in a non-linear way upon the wave function, 
which evolves according to the standard Schrödinger equation.
According to Allori et al. (2008), however, the difference between these 
apparently opposite approaches to fixing standard quantum mechanics 
is not as stark as it seems. GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics may be 
interpreted as sharing a common structure: ‘they are ultimately not about 
wave functions but about “matter” moving in space, represented by either 
particle trajectories, fields on space-time, or a discrete set of space-time 
points.’ This configuration of matter makes up the world of macroscopic 
objects, including our measuring devices, and ‘the role of the wave func-
tion . . . is to govern the motion of the matter’ (p. 353).
In the Bohmian primitive ontology, this configuration of primitive mat-
ter consists of N discrete particles. The trajectory of every particle is gov-
erned by an equation of motion that is first-order in time, which depends 
upon both the universal wave function ψ and the positions {Q1, . . ., QN} 
of all the other particles comprising the global configuration:
d
dt
mi i N i




, , Im…  (6)
where υψi  is the velocity of particle i at time t, and mi is its gravitational 
mass.38 In the GRWm primitive ontology for GRW theory, which was 
first suggested in Ghirardi et al. (1995), the matter is not discrete but 
consists of infinitely divisible gunk. It is a matter-field whose distribu-
tion of matter-density m(x, t) expands with the unitary evolution of the 
wave function ψ and contracts in spontaneous localisation events, which 
is governed by an equation of the form:












q q q q q1 δ ψ N , (7)
where the sum ranges over the N quantum ‘particles’ in the physical 
system (from i = 1 to i = N), and the integral ranges over the whole of 
the 3N-dimensional configuration space in which the wave function 
ψ is defined. (In computing m(x, t) for a given position x and time t, 
the integration of the wave function ψ combined with the Dirac delta 
function δ(qi – x) gives us the marginal distribution of the ith degree of 
freedom qi ∈ R3, by integrating out all other variables qj, then one takes 
the mass-weighted sum of these contributions for all of the particles.)
In both cases, the microscopic description of standard quantum 
mechanics is completed, and the existence of determinate measurement 
outcomes is ontologically explained, by the introduction of a spatiotem-
poral distribution of primitive matter, which is choreographed by a wave 
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function that is defined as a holistic feature of the physical system. In both 
cases, this distribution of matter lacks any intrinsic physical properties. 
The particles (or parcels of gunk) are holistically individuated by the 
distance relations in which they stand, deriving their physical natures 
from the wholes of which they are parts. The wave function of quan-
tum mechanics, which is defined in a high-dimensional configuration 
space, is not included as part of the fundamental ontology, to avoid 
creating an interaction problem involving two separate domains, but 
is assigned a nomological role in explaining the motion of the matter 
in physical space.
It must be emphasised that the matter in these primitive ontologies can-
not be read off the formalism of standard quantum mechanics or deduced 
from any other physical concept or from the vocabulary of any physical 
theory. It is posited for the sake of empirical adequacy, since there are 
facts about which way the pointers on our measuring devices are point-
ing. A primitive ontology approach aims to explain the measurement 
outcomes of quantum experiments, like the EPR experiment, and more 
generally to explain the behaviour of the macroscopic objects upon which 
scientists depend to make their measurements, by offering an account of 
the empirical content of a physical theory that is exhausted by its state-
ments about this primitive distribution of matter (Maudlin, 2019).
3.2.  Cosmic Hylomorphism
There is good reason to think, however, that a fundamental ontology con-
sisting solely of matter without intrinsic physical properties is too sparse 
to account for the truth of the laws that determine the spatiotemporal 
development of the matter. Something more is needed, in addition to a 
distribution of particles or gunk, in order to explain the phenomena that 
scientists observe in quantum experiments.
3.2.1.  Bohmian Mechanics
I wish to focus in the remainder of this section on the Bohmian solution 
to the measurement problem, which attributes to the cosmos a universal 
wave function that does not collapse. In Section 4, I will consider a dif-
ferent approach to quantum mechanics, in which the wave function is 
permitted to collapse.
Bohmian mechanics takes the non-locality of quantum mechanics seri-
ously, providing an account of quantum experiments in terms of both the 
universal wave function ψ and a set of N particles. Although we cannot 
measure the universal wave function, nor can we trace the trajectories of 
the Bohmian particles, it is possible under certain conditions to provide 
an empirically adequate account of a subsystem of physical particles in 
terms of the effective wave function of the subsystem, which encodes the 
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statistical information about the positions of the particles that can be 
recovered in an experiment. According to Bohmian mechanics, it is only 
effective wave functions which are subject to collapse.
For Bohmians, the quantum spin of a particle is explained by the effec-
tive wave function of the particle and its initial position. Suppose we 
direct a spin 1/2 particle at the magnets of a Stern-Gerlach device, such 
that its wave function splits into ‘up’ and ‘down’ wavepackets. The way 
in which the particle travels within the apparatus – its ‘choice’, let’s say, 
to travel up rather than down – is determined by its initial position in 
relation to the magnets and their fields. If this particle is entangled with 
another particle in the singleton state (1), however, that choice changes 
the wave function of the other particle, guaranteeing that it will go down 
when it is measured. In effect, the wave function of the second particle 
has been forced to evolve non-locally in three-dimensional space, with the 
local behaviour of particle 1 nomically determining the wave function of 
particle 2. Consequently, after the measurement of particle 1, the ‘spin’ of 
particle 2 – and hence its trajectory – is no longer a function of its position 
in relation to the magnets used to measure it.
If the orientation of the magnetic field used to measure particle 1 were 
reversed, however, and one measured the spin of particle 1, particle 1 
would travel down rather than up, assuming the initial position of particle 
1 to be the same with respect to the apparatus. In that case, one would 
obtain a wave function for particle 2 in which it travelled up instead, 
irrespective of its initial position. The Bohmian is thus committed to the 
existence of action at a distance – an action that cannot be explained by 
mechanical contact or the intermediation of physical fields – since the 
scientist’s choice of the orientation of the magnetic field which measures 
the spin of particle 1 affects not only the motion of particle 1 but also of 
particle 2, however far apart the two particles are from one another.
The Bohmian is also committed to the existence of a world in which 
there are definite physical objects and determinate measurement out-
comes: there is always a fact of the matter about where every particle 
stands in relation to one another, and the macroscopic devices which 
are used to make measurements are composed of particles. According to 
the kinematic interpretation of Bohmian mechanics, the particles do not 
have any intrinsic physical properties, but every particle in the cosmos is 
assigned an instantaneous velocity which depends on the definite positions 
of all the other particles and the universal wave function. The Schrödinger 
equation and the guiding equation comprise the non-classical dynamics 
of a particle configuration that exists independently of our observations.
The Bohmian theory, for all practical purposes, is empirically equivalent 
to standard (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics.39 Agreement with the 
Born rule, which gives the probability that a measurement of a quantum 
system will yield a given result, is secured via the quantum equilibrium 
hypothesis: specifically, if the initial configuration of the particles at t may 
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be supposed to be randomly distributed with a probability distribution 
ρ ψt t=( )= =0 0
2 , then it follows as a consequence of the Schrödinger 
equation and the Bohmian equation of motion that this relationship will 
hold at some later time t > 0 for the distribution ρ ψt t( )=
2 .40 Although 
the particles have determinate positions, we cannot know where all of 
the particles are, and so we must resort to the probabilities of quantum 
mechanics in order to make any predictions. Nature does not wear all 
of her properties on her sleeves. Nonetheless, the physical state of the 
world is completely specified by the wave function and the positions of 
the particles.
3.2.2.  Rival Views of Laws
Yet why would particles without physical properties follow the trajec-
tories laid out for them in Bohmian mechanics, supposing a theory like 
Bohmian mechanics were true? The Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley con-
ception of lawhood as a second-order relation between universals, for 
example, is unsuitable, since the particles do not have any properties that 
could instantiate necessitation relations and the wave function is not part 
of the primitive ontology. According to the ‘primitive ontology approach’ 
to quantum mechanics espoused by Allori et al. (2008), the wave function 
of quantum mechanics plays a nomological role in the temporal develop-
ment of the particles. However, there are two ways of spelling out this 
role: namely, by appealing to a Humean account of laws, in which laws 
are merely summaries of regularities for all space and time, or to some 
form of dispositionalism, in which laws are grounded in powers (Esfeld 
et al., 2017).
Michael Esfeld has proposed an ontology for Bohmian mechanics in 
which the world is composed of ‘matter points’, which are nothing over 
and above the distance relations in which they stand (Esfeld and Deckert, 
2017). To accommodate the truth of the Bohmian law of motion, which 
is specified in terms of both the particles and the wave function, Esfeld 
adopts the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws, in which a regularity 
only qualifies as a law of nature just in case it is an axiom in the ‘best 
system’ that balances strength and simplicity in deriving the facts about 
the positions of the matter points.41 According to this Humean account 
of the quantum state, the Bohmian law and the quantum state supervene 
upon nothing less than the global configuration of particles for all time.
However, many philosophers have found Humean accounts of laws 
to be deeply unsatisfactory. For instance, Humeanism fails to capture 
the intuition that laws have metaphysical work to do in explaining what 
happens. According to Humeans, the Bohmian law depends for its law-
fulness upon the global configuration of particles and is thus constituted 
by that which it seeks to explain. Yet ‘a fact cannot be used to explain 
itself’ (Armstrong, 1983, p. 40), as Armstrong complained. In making this 
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claim, Armstrong was echoing Plato’s insight that things are explained by 
being referred to a ‘higher principle’. The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account, 
however, not only fails to maintain the necessary metaphysical distance 
between explanans and explanandum, but also reverses the proper order 
of explanation: laws are supposed to explain instances that fall under 
them, yet the lawfulness of laws in this model is grounded in the instances 
they are supposed to explain. Doubts have also been raised about the 
logical coherence of the Super-Humean’s attempt to make the doctrine 
of Humean supervenience compatible with quantum entanglement.42 For 
example, in rejecting an ontology of sparse natural properties in favour 
of a supervenience base consisting solely of positions, the Super-Humean 
removes an objective constraint upon what could count as a ‘best system’ 
of laws, leading to the well-known problem of ‘immanent comparisons’ 
and to subjectivism about the laws of nature (Matarese, 2018).
In order to build a metaphysical model that incorporates a power to 
choreograph the trajectories of the particles according to the Bohmian 
law of motion, however, a dispositionalist must answer a number of 
metaphysical questions. For instance: what sort of thing might be sup-
posed to possess a causal power which could ground the Bohmian law of 
motion? Some dispositionalists have been tempted to attribute Bohmian 
particles with their own intrinsic dispositions. For example, Suárez has 
suggested that each Bohmian particle has powers to change its velocity 
which depend upon the spatial configuration of all the other particles 
for their stimulation (Suárez, 2015). It is doubtful, however, that this 
conspiracy model offers any advantage over Super-Humeanism. For one 
thing, Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct coun-
terfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only 
a few particles, since the lawfulness of the Bohmian law of motion is not 
due to any intrinsic features of the particles which could be duplicated in 
other possible worlds, and so we should expect a Small World to have dif-
ferent laws. For another, it seems that Bohmian dispositionalism is subject 
to a serious dilemma: either time must be regarded as discrete rather than 
continuous, or the powers of the particles fail to determine the particles’ 
trajectories (Simpson and Pemberton, 2021).
A dispositionalist might propose that the plurality of particles has a 
single, collective property – namely, the property of instantiating a power 
to choreograph their trajectories according to the Bohmian law. This 
property would be intrinsic to the plurality of particles, rather than to any 
of the individual particles. Yet such an account faces two metaphysical 
challenges (Simpson, 2021). In the first place, the Bohmian law of motion 
is specified not merely in terms of the positions of all the particles but in 
terms of a universal wave function, which does not supervene upon the 
particle configuration but evolves according to the Schrödinger equation. 
To explain the law-like behaviour of the particle configuration, this global 
power would have to persist through time and ground the lawfulness of 
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the Schrödinger equation. In the second place, in order to capture intui-
tively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds 
which have only a few particles (Carroll, 1994; Demarest, 2017), the 
identity of this global power should not depend upon the number of par-
ticles in the global configuration. There would have to be possible worlds 
in which the same global power is instantiated by a different number of 
particles. What we require, then, is a metaphysics that can explain both 
the diachronic and transworld sameness of this collective causal power. 
Cosmic Hylomorphism provides such a model, in which the only funda-
mental physical entity is the cosmos.
3.2.3.  Cosmic Form
According to the Cosmic Hylomorphist, the cosmos is a substance which 
is metaphysically composed of both matter and a Cosmic Form (Simpson, 
2021; cf. Schaffer, 2010). The matter of this substance may be identified 
with the Bohmian particles, which are endowed with causal powers to 
change their velocities. However, these particles are not substances which 
possess their own essential and intrinsic powers. Rather, their causal pow-
ers are metaphysically grounded in the Cosmic Form, which manifests 
a cosmic process.43 The material particles, thus empowered, are trans-
formed into the integral physical parts of a cosmic whole.
In this model, Cosmic Form is a simple and fundamental particular 
with the power to manifest a cosmic process (cf. Koons, 2018). The Cos-
mic Form is not located in physical space, along with the particles it 
transforms, since it does not stand in any distance relations, nor is it the 
efficient cause of their motion, since they have their own causal powers 
to bring about change. Rather, the Cosmic Form brings about change 
indirectly, in the course of manifesting the cosmic process, by grounding 
the powers of the particles at each moment of time. In so doing, the Cos-
mic Form unites itself to all of the particles to compose a single substance 
with an intrinsic power to choreograph their trajectories according to the 
Bohmian law.44 It is the Cosmic Form that explains the diachronic and 
transworld sameness of this collective power.
Although this neo-Aristotelian account of Bohmian mechanics departs 
in significant ways from Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of nature, as 
it was understood by Aquinas, it nevertheless deploys Aristotle’s four-
fold conception of causation to provide a non-mechanical explanation 
of quantum phenomena. The similarities with the ancient doctrine of 
hylomorphism are evident in at least three respects.
In the first place, the material particles that it posits are at least analo-
gous to Aristotle’s concept of matter: by supplying a persisting substrate 
which has the potential to bear causal powers, they serve as the material 
cause of the cosmic whole. The Cosmic Substance has no physical exis-
tence apart from its matter. Unlike Aquinas’s concept of prime matter, the 
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particles are metaphysically discrete and stand in distance relations. Prime 
matter is more than a substratum of bare potentiality, on this account, 
since it is spatially extended. The particles constitute a materia prima, 
however, in the restricted sense that they lack any intrinsic physical fea-
tures. The phenomenon of quantum entanglement gives us good reason 
to doubt that particles have intrinsic physical properties independently of 
the wholes of which they are parts (Section 3.1).
In the second place, the Cosmic Form is analogous to Aristotle’s concept 
of substantial form: by grounding the causal powers of the particles, the 
Cosmic Form acts as the formal cause of the Cosmic Substance, causing it 
to be the kind of unified substance that it is. Unlike Aristotle’s account of 
the forms, there is only one substance in nature, and none of the objects 
of ordinary experience – including biological entities – are said to have 
substantial forms. A ‘formal cause’ that operates instantaneously upon 
matter can provide a non-mechanical explanation of the non-local cor-
relations associated with quantum phenomena, however, since it is only 
efficient causes which are mediated in space and time. The Cosmic Form 
can explain the motion of the Bohmian particle configuration without 
violating the ‘superluminal ban’ in physics.
In the third place, this account reintroduces an element of teleology 
within physics: the ultimate explanation for the motion of the Bohm-
ian particles is that the activity of the Cosmic Substance is a teleological 
process. The ordering of this process cannot be explained mechanically 
in terms of laws that connect one set of properties instantiated at time t 
with another set of properties instantiated at time t > t, since the wave 
function is not an element of the fundamental ontology and the particles 
do not have intrinsic physical properties which stand in law-like relations. 
Rather, the ordering of this process is only explained by taking a teleologi-
cal stance, in which the temporal development of the Cosmic Substance 
has an intrinsic direction (that is, the substance admits a final cause). 
Unlike Aristotle’s concept of final causes, the final cause of the Cosmic 
Substance can be described mathematically in terms of the boundary con-
dition on a universal wave function defined in an abstract configuration 
space, which contains information about possible trajectories of particles 
in different possible worlds. However, the universal wave function of the 
cosmos is not a property that we can measure.
Cosmic Hylomorphism is of course a far cry from that medieval vision 
of nature in which many of the objects of ordinary experience, including 
human beings, were substances with their own natures. Nonetheless, it 
represents a decisive break with the microphysical reductionism that 
dominated the philosophy of the last century and the corpuscularian 
assumption that nature wears all her properties on her sleeves for sci-
entists to inspect. According to the Cosmic Hylomorphist, the cosmos 
is unintelligible apart from its substantial form, which grounds the 
properties of its matter, but the only way in which its matter and form 
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can be separated is by metaphysical abstraction rather than scientific 
manipulation.
Cosmic Hylomorphism offers a way of understanding what the world 
might be like, if the laws of Bohmian mechanics were true, in which the 
universal wave function is not an element of the fundamental ontology, but 
represents an intrinsic power of a Cosmic Substance that is grounded in 
its substantial form. Yet there are reasons to doubt the claim that the cos-
mos can be represented as a single quantum system with a universal wave 
function – even in principle – which I shall discuss in the following section.
4.  Form in Quantum Statistical Mechanics
The phenomenon of quantum entanglement is not the only reason to recon-
sider the supposed redundancy of hylomorphism. The microphysicalism 
that dominated analytic philosophy in the last century has also run into 
difficulties in accommodating novel and robust phenomena that emerge 
at higher scales. According to the standard monistic approach to realism 
adopted by many philosophers, a physical theory is supposed to provide 
a universally true and exhaustive description of the world in all physical 
respects and at all physical scales. However, the turn toward scientific prac-
tices in the philosophy of science has given rise to a pluralistic understand-
ing of scientific theories, which has called into question the philosopher’s 
aspiration of advancing a fundamental physical ontology. In what follows, I 
shall discuss the dilemma that an alternative pluralistic approach to realism 
faces between pragmatism and reductionism, in the context of quantum 
statistical mechanics, and will propose a way of splitting the horns of this 
dilemma by adopting a hylomorphic approach to realism that admits a plu-
rality of fundamental substances (instead of a single Cosmic Substance).45
4.1.  A Question of Context
4.1.1.  Unitarily Inequivalent Representations
According to the standard approach to scientific realism, a scientific the-
ory’s explanatory virtues gives us good reason to attribute (some aspect 
of) that theory with representational content. There is a striking disparity, 
however, between the standard approach to realism and the way that 
quantum theories are used to explain phenomena in practice. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I shall focus on phenomena described by the 
theory of quantum statistical mechanics, although the same difficulties 
arise in quantum field theory.46
At the core of any quantum theory are the canonical commutation rela-
tions between conjugate quantities such as position and momentum – or 
the anticommutation relations that hold between the Pauli spin matrices – 
which encode Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Any quantum theory 
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which specifies a quantum state ψ  of a physical system defined in a Hil-
bert space H, and a set of bounded self-adjoint operators corresponding 
to observables (H, Ôi ) which act upon the quantum state Ôi ψ , must 
realise the Weyl algebra associated with these relations. When the opera-
tors on a Hilbert space conform to these commutation relations, they are 
said to be a ‘representation’ of these relations.
Unitary equivalence is widely considered the standard of empirical 
equivalence: if two representations are unitarily equivalent, there is some 
unitary operator Û  that transforms one representation into the other 
U: H → HU O U Oi i
− ′ =1 ˆ ˆ, such that they both determine the same expectation values 
for the various observables which they define: U O U Oi i
− ′ =1 ˆ ˆ . However, 
the theory of quantum statistical mechanics generates a continuum of uni-
tarily inequivalent representations in the so-called thermodynamic limit 
(Ruetsche, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2013), where it is necessary to adopt models 
which have infinite degrees of freedom in order to describe many kinds of 
physical phenomena. Whilst the Stone-von Neumann theorem establishes 
that any pairs of distinct representations for a finite system will be unitar-
ily equivalent to the irreducible Schrödinger representation, since there 
is a unitary operator that transforms one into the other, infinite systems 
admit infinitely many Hilbert-space representations which fall outside of 
the scope of the Stone-von Neumann theorem (Ruetsche, 2011, chs. 2–3).
Let us consider the example of a ferromagnet. When a physical system 
experiences a phase transition, certain properties of the system undergo 
discontinuous change due to some macroscopic change in their immedi-
ate external conditions. An iron bar that is at thermal equilibrium, for 
instance, exhibits a paramagnetic phase above a critical temperature 
T ≥ Tc, in which it experiences no net magnetisation. Below this critical 
temperature, however, it exhibits a ferromagnetic phase, in which it expe-
riences spontaneous magnetisation. In the presence of an external mag-
netic field, the ferromagnet admits two possible metastable states which 
are characterised by opposite magnetic polarisations. These two states, as 
it turns out, must be defined using unitarily inequivalent representations.
Proof: To demonstrate this inequivalence for the more mathematically 
minded (others may prefer to skip this argument), suppose we set up 
a Hilbert space for a system whose ground state is characterised by 
a sequence sk = +1 for k ∈ Z, then add all the sequences that can be 
obtained by making finitely many local modifications to this sequence 
which replace some of the entries with −1.47 Let us label this Hilbert space 
H+. A set of operators σ̂z
j  may then be introduced such that sequences sk 
whose jth entry is ±1 correspond to the eigenvector in the Hilbert space 
associated with the eigenvalue ±1. A magnetic polarisation observable
m̂  can be defined for the composite system with the components:
ˆ ˆ , , ,m
N











∑12 1 σ , (8)
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which has a limit N → ∞ in the weak topology of H+. Let [sk]j ∈ 
{−1, +1} denote the jth entry in the sequence sk. For every state, the 
expectation value of m̂  will be oriented along the z axis and will take 
the value of +1 in the thermodynamic limit, breaking the rotational 
symmetry of the system’s dynamics, since only a finite number of 
spins take the value −1. But what about states that break this sym-
metry in the opposite direction? For these cases, we begin with a 
ground state characterised by a sequence sk = −1 for k ∈ Z, adding 
all the sequences that can be obtained by making finitely many local 
modifications which replace some of the entries with +1. Let us label 
this alternative Hilbert space H−.
It is obvious that our two representations of the ground state 
are inequivalent. The proof may proceed by contradiction. Sup-
pose there is some unitary transformation, U: H+ → H−, such that 
U Un nˆ ˆσ σ
+ − −=1  for all n, which implies that ˆ ˆm Um UN N− + −= 1 , and 
suppose that ψ+  and ψ−  are unit vectors in the Hilbert spaces 
H+ and H− respectively. Assuming that these two vectors are related 
by the transformation |ψ+> = U−1 |ψ−>, it follows that




However, this identity does not hold in the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, 
since the right-hand side evaluates as +1 and the left-hand side as −1. 
These two representations do not admit a unitary transformation, 
and the Hamiltonians defined on these two infinite models describe 
physically different situations.
Nonetheless, the use of infinite models defined in the thermodynamic 
limit, which deploy unitarily inequivalent representations, turns out to 
be necessary for empirical adequacy in describing quantum systems.48 
The statistical physics of finite systems identifies equilibrium states with 
unique Gibbs states (Ruetsche, 2011, p. 3), implying that the phase avail-
able to a system at temperature T is unique for all T. Yet this is contrary to 
what we observe in experiments. According to Ruetsche, it is ‘only in the 
thermodynamic limit [that] one can introduce a notion of equilibrium that 
allows what the Gibbs notion of equilibrium for finite systems disallows: 
the multiplicity of equilibrium states at a finite temperature implicated in 
phase structure’ (p. 3). It is a detail which the more pragmatically minded 
physicist will doubtless be tempted to gloss over, but one which a scientific 
realist in search of an ontology will have to take into consideration.
4.1.2.  Scientific Pluralism
According to the standard approach to realism, a realist should be preoc-
cupied with the counterfactual question: what would the world be like if 
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this scientific theory provided a universally true and exhaustive description 
of the physical world? According to Ruetsche, however, it is incumbent 
upon any would-be interpreter to answer the question: ‘does this interpre-
tation allow the theory to discharge all of its scientific duties?’ The problem 
with the standard approach to realism, from this practical standpoint, is 
that ‘there often isn’t a single interpretation under which a theory enjoys the 
full range of virtues realists are wont to cite as reasons for believing that 
theory’ (Ruetsche, 2011, p. 5). In practice, physicists deploy a plurality of 
inequivalent representations to capture the phenomena in which they are 
interested, for which the correct choice is context-dependent.
In our example of the ferromagnet, it is evident that the quantum theory 
that describes the behaviour of the physical system admits of (at least) 
two representations, and that these representations are not empirically 
equivalent. There is no obvious reason for preferring one to the other, and 
there is good reason to doubt that they share a common structure which 
completely determines the physical content of both representations. How 
should we proceed?
On the one hand, to privilege the physical content of one particular 
representation (‘Hilbert space conservatism’) would be to reduce the num-
ber of physically significant states to a subset of those that are generally 
accepted within successful scientific practices (Ruetsche, 2003). On the 
other hand, to confine the physical content of a quantum theory to the 
algebraic structure that is shared by different Hilbert space representa-
tions (‘algebraic imperialism’) would be to reduce the number of physi-
cally significant observables that are measured within successful scientific 
practices. Either of these moves fails to support the explanatory agenda of 
our best quantum theories and is inconsistent with the practice of adopt-
ing a realist stance toward physical theories in virtue of their explanatory 
successes. It seems there is no single universal representation in which all 
the observables of a complex system can be defined and in which they 
evolve in a continuous way.
Porter Williams argues that philosophers should content themselves 
with adopting an effective realism (Williams, 2017). According to effective 
realists, physical theories are not absolutely true in all physical respects and 
at all physical scales, but that should not matter to philosophers of science, 
as they are only ever applied within limited regimes in successful scientific 
practices. The task of the effective realist is to identify elements described 
by an effective theory that are ‘stable and robust’, inasmuch as they are 
detectable and measurable and ‘can be expected to survive future episodes 
of theory change’ (p. 218). It is these elements to which we should be onto-
logically committed.49 Williams articulates his brand of effective realism 
within the context of quantum field theory, which is widely acknowledged 
to be an effective field theory that breaks down at small scales and that 
depends upon the practice of renormalisation to secure limited regimes 
within which empirically adequate models can be constructed.
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There is much to recommend this pluralistic approach to realism to 
metaphysicians seeking to be guided by scientific practices. As Williams 
observes, the attempt to extract a single fundamental ontology from a 
physical theory, which characterises the standard approach to realism, 
‘leaves one with an interpretation unequipped to support the theory in 
the performance of its explanatory duties’ (p. 228), whereas a pluralistic 
approach to realism which acknowledges the context-dependence of our 
interpretations opens the prospect of uncovering ‘a rich, layered ontology’ 
that is otherwise hidden from the standard realist (p. 220). There is also 
something salutatory about his exhortation to technically minded phi-
losophers of physics that the business of constructing ontologies ‘contains 
considerable amounts of art as well as science’ (p. 233). It is questionable, 
however, whether effective realism can steer a middle course between 
the Scylla of pragmatic empiricism and the Charybdis of microphysical 
reductionism.
On the one hand, it is unclear why philosophers should prefer an effec-
tive realism that embraces a complex ontology to a pragmatic empiri-
cism that shuns ontological commitment, on the basis of the reasons put 
forward by Williams. As Ruetsche points out, both approaches oppose 
physical fundamentalism by seeking to disentangle the question of explan-
atory power from the question of universal truth (Ruetsche, 2020). The 
philosopher who is seeking to extract a fundamental ontology from some 
physical theory T ‘has to endow a physical theory with explanatory self-
sufficiency. Otherwise, something exogenous to T is required to explain 
why T works in some regimes but not others, and why things aren’t quite 
the way T says they should be’ (p. 308). The effective realist, however, 
believes we can construct explanations of T’s success which make no 
appeal to T’s truth, since we have good reasons to think that T is only an 
effective theory, and hence to reject the fundamentalist’s assumption of T’s 
explanatory self-sufficiency. According to Ruetsche, ‘Fundamentalism’s 
sin isn’t to interpret T. It’s to decide that, having interpreted T, no further 
explanatory work remains – and thereby suppress the possibility that T 
is merely effective’ (p. 309). Ruetsche argues that effective realism can be 
exchanged for a humble empiricism which eschews ontological commit-
ment without sacrificing explanation. ‘The humble empiricists answer is 
that our theory succeeds as well as it does where it does, not because it’s 
true, but because, whatever the true theory is, our theory approximates it 
in its domain of application’ (p. 310).
On the other hand, it is unclear why philosophers who are strongly 
committed to realism over pragmatic empiricism should prefer an effec-
tive realism that produces a fragmented picture of reality to some form of 
weak emergence that maintains a commitment to the unity of nature. It 
may be argued that the interpretation of quantum theories only appears 
to be context-dependent because we are cognitively incapable of model-
ling complex systems without introducing approximations, and that the 
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existence of unitarily inequivalent representations of quantum theories is 
merely an artefact of reifying the infinite degrees of freedom which are 
introduced in the thermodynamic limit (or in quantum field theories). 
After all, it is doubtful that many physicists take any infinities literally, 
regarding them rather as idealisations or abstractions (Ellis et al., 2018). 
According to Wallace (2011), the problem of unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations is circumvented in conventional quantum field theory by the 
introduction of cutoffs which limit its application to systems with only 
finite degrees of freedom. Yet, as Fraser (2009) has argued, the necessity 
of cutoffs suggests conventional quantum field theory is only an effective 
field theory and unsuitable for standard interpretation. In that case, it may 
be urged, realists will have to wait for some better theory.
4.2.  Hylomorphic Pluralism
For the contemporary philosopher of science, it may seem as though the 
options lie between some kind of fragmented pluralism, which rules out a 
single unified account of how everything hangs together, or some sort of 
eschatological monism, which allows the possibility of a theory of every-
thing but admits that such a theory may lie forever beyond our grasp. Yet 
there may be a third way, which affirms the plurality of physical being 
and the existence of entities at different scales, without abandoning the 
commitment to a fundamental ontology.
4.2.1.  Contextual Wave Function Collapse
I wish to consider the possible existence of macroscopic entities between 
the microscopic and the cosmic scale, which are neither integral parts of 
a single Cosmic Substance nor reducible to a single set of microscopic 
constituents, but which may nonetheless be said to have microscopic 
parts. For an Aristotelian who is committed to the Eleatic principle, a 
substance which has fundamental physical being is marked by its posses-
sion of irreducible causal powers (Section 2). A macroscopic substance 
would have to have causal powers over and above the powers of any of its 
constituents to be included in the fundamental ontology. Yet is there room 
in contemporary physics, which is widely supposed to concern the proper-
ties of point-sized particles and fields that make up everything else, for 
the existence of substances which have irreducibly macroscopic powers?
In fact, there are many cases where microscopic physical theories 
contain physical quantities which are not determined by the theory but 
depend upon large-scale properties of the physical system. For example, 
most physical theories are written in terms of differential equations, yet 
physical models can only produce testable predictions once boundary 
conditions for these equations have been specified. These physical bound-
ary conditions often have a macroscopic origin.
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The standard approach to realism downplays the role of macroscopic 
properties in specifying the boundary conditions of physical systems, 
because it assumes that the total state of the physical world can be 
uniquely represented by our best physical theory as a single closed sys-
tem which evolves according to the universal laws of our ‘best physics’. 
For example, in the de Broglie-Bohm version of quantum mechanics, the 
temporal development of the matter is determined for the whole configu-
ration by a law of nature which is specified solely in terms of microscopic 
quantities (positions) and a global quantity (the wave function) defined 
at the cosmic scale. The evolution of the total configuration of matter 
does not depend upon any macroscopic (intermediate-scale) quantities. 
Yet there are good reasons, as we have seen, to doubt whether there is an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics that is true in all physical respects 
and at all physical scales.
An alternative ‘contextual’ model of the quantum dynamics is avail-
able, however, proposed by Barbara Drossel and George Ellis, in which 
the interaction of a quantum system with the intrinsic heat bath of a 
macroscopic system, such as the measuring device that a scientist might 
deploy in a laboratory, plays a key role in solving the measurement prob-
lem (Drossel and Ellis, 2018). In this interpretation, quantum systems 
are individual systems, which are ‘open’ to the influence of a ‘classical’ 
environment that cannot be modelled as a single quantum system, and 
the macroscopic, thermal properties of certain features of the environment 
have the power to collapse their wave function.
The CWC model (contextual wave function collapse) drops the assump-
tion of physical monism that underpins the choice between GRW theory 
and Bohmian mechanics (Section 3.1.2) by denying that the theory of 
quantum mechanics is endowed with explanatory self-sufficiency and 
allowing something exogenous to quantum mechanics to complete its 
physical description in different contexts. According to Drossel, a ther-
malised system cannot be described by a many-particle wave function 
(Drossel, 2017). There is more to the intrinsic heat bath of a macroscopic 
system than the sum of its microscopic parts. Whilst this approach to 
quantum mechanics has certain features in common with the GRW and 
Bohmian theories, it also differs from them in significant ways.
As in the GRW modification of quantum mechanics, the CWC model 
seizes the first horn of Bell’s dilemma, allowing the wave function to 
become localised with respect to position. It likewise distinguishes sci-
entific measurements from localisation events in general, removing the 
necessity of a scientific ‘observer’ in order for there to be any facts about 
the physical properties of quantum systems. Unlike GRW theory, how-
ever, the corrections that achieve these localisations of the wave func-
tion depend upon the macroscopic context of a physical system, which 
includes systems which instantiate macroscopic thermal properties, rather 
than the introduction of an additional collapse mechanism. In short, the 
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CWC model proposes incorporating a feedback loop – from a particle, 
via the intrinsic heat bath of a macroscopic system, back to the particle – 






= + ( )ψ ψ ψ ψ  (10)
where H is the Hamiltonian of an idealised closed system and f is a non-
linear contribution due to the external environment. This extra term is 
physically motivated: it can be accounted for in terms of thermodynamics 
and solid-state physics (Drossel and Ellis, 2018, pp. 13–19).50
As in Bohmian mechanics, the CWC model relies upon the effects of the 
environment upon the measuring process to explain why the outcomes of 
quantum experiments, such as the EPR experiment (Section 3.1), conform 
to standard quantum statistics and obey Born’s rule for connecting quan-
tum ‘observables’ with the wave function of a physical system. Unlike 
Bohmian mechanics, the CWC model does not conceive the environment 
that is relevant to the measuring process in terms of a many-particle sys-
tem with a wave function that is subject to the unitary and reversible time 
evolution described by Schrödinger’s linear dynamics. In fact, the heat 
bath of any finite temperature system that is capable of collapsing the 
wave function is characterised as having only a limited ‘memory’, since it 
radiates irreversibly into the heat sink of its surroundings. Consequently, 
the CWC model does not leave any physical system entangled with any 
part of its environment beyond the usual time scale of decoherence, plac-
ing a limit on the extent of quantum entanglement in nature. According 
to the CWC model, the heat bath of a macroscopic instrument of mea-
surement serves as a bridge between quantum systems and their classical 
environment, since the heat bath of a macroscopic system can induce the 
collapse of the wave function.
The CWC theorist agrees with the GRW and Bohmian theorists that 
standard quantum mechanics is physically incomplete. Unlike GRW 
theory and Bohmian mechanics, however, CWC theory does not offer a 
universal way of completing quantum mechanics that purports to describe 
every physical aspect of the world at every physical scale, but restricts 
itself to describing the quantal properties of open quantum systems whose 
dynamics depend upon macroscopic features of their classical environ-
ments. From this standpoint, a purely quantal system (in which f → 0 
in (10)) is an idealised isolated system that does not exist in the real 
world. Drossel and Ellis believe that we should reject ‘the untestable and 
implausible claim that the environmental heat bath can be described by 
an infinite-precision wave function that is subject to unitary time evolu-
tion’ (p. 4).
In this contextual approach to quantum mechanics, classical properties 
are supposed to be higher-level, strongly emergent properties of physical 
systems, which have top-down causal powers to change the microscopic 
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properties of systems. They derive these causal powers from the funda-
mental role that they play in defining the Hilbert spaces and the time 
scales within which the unitary time evolution of an open quantum system 
takes place.
4.2.2.  Rival Views of Macroscopic Entities
Yet how are macroscopic properties like temperature and chemical 
entropy, which characterise complex physical systems like measuring 
devices, supposed to ‘emerge’ from simpler microphysical systems, and 
what is the nature of the microphysical substrate from which a macro-
scopic entity is supposed to emerge? Drossel and Ellis’s commitment to 
strong emergence may seem to confront an ontological dilemma between 
microphysical reductionism or substance dualism.
On the one hand, suppose the causal powers of an emergent macro-
scopic whole can be explained entirely in terms of the properties and 
causal powers of its microscopic parts. These microphysical parts do not 
depend upon the whole for their physical properties but have their own 
intrinsic natures. In that case, the emergent macroscopic whole must be 
ontologically reducible to or supervenient upon the aggregation of its 
microscopic parts and should not be counted among the fundamental 
entities of nature. Yet CWC theory does not appear to be compatible with 
microphysical reductionism, since it provides the macroscopic properties 
of one system (such as a measuring device) with an irreducible role to 
play in collapsing the wave function of another system, thus endowing 
macroscopic properties with top-down causal powers.
It may be argued that the macroscopic properties of an emergent 
whole do not locally supervene upon its microscopic constituents, but 
globally supervene upon nothing less than the entire cosmos: the cos-
mos as a whole is an emergent entity with its own intrinsic nature. In 
that case, the macroscopic emergent whole should be regarded as an 
integral part of the physical cosmos and should not be counted among 
the fundamental entities of nature. Such entities are merely artefacts 
of the boundary conditions that we impose upon physical systems. Yet 
CWC theory does not seem to be compatible with cosmic holism, since 
it rejects the claim that the cosmos as a whole has a universal wave func-
tion as an ‘untestable and implausible’ assumption (Drossel and Ellis, 
2018, p. 4) and insists on adopting a contextual approach to the wave 
function’s dynamics.
On the other hand, suppose that the activities of an emergent macro-
scopic whole cannot be explained in terms of the causal powers of its 
microscopic constituents, but that the macroscopic whole has a novel 
and irreducible causal power which directly acts upon the microscopic 
constituents and causes them to change their collective behaviour. In that 
case, there would be good reason to count this macroscopic entity as a 
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separate entity that interacts with these microscopic entities rather than 
being composed of them (Gillett, 2016, p. 247). If the relation between 
this macroscopic entity and these microscopic entities is merely a causal 
relation between different entities which have their own intrinsic causal 
powers, then the macroscopic entity and the microscopic entities are 
ontologically independent substances, since they do not depend upon one 
another for their physical natures. Yet CWC theory does not appear to 
be compatible with a dualism of microscopic and macroscopic entities, 
since it does not supply a complete quantum mechanical characterisation 
of any microscopic entity but only characterises quantum systems within 
different macroscopic contexts.
It may be argued that the emergent causal power which is exercised by 
the macroscopic whole is not a fundamental power of the whole, which 
has its own nature and primitive identity, but is a ‘structural power’ that 
is instantiated by its microscopic constituents, which arises from a kind 
of conspiracy that occurs between them whenever they are spatiotem-
porally configured in a certain way. In that case, we would have good 
reason to count this macroscopic entity as a functional whole, since its 
behaviour would be a non-linear function of the intrinsic properties of its 
microscopic constituents. Such macroscopic entities are not fundamental 
substances, as they do not constitute any addition to being over and above 
their constituents. Yet CWC theory leaves us unenlightened concerning 
the microscopic domain of these non-linear functions, since it has nothing 
to say about the properties of microscopic constituents independently of 
their different macroscopic contexts. What we require, then, is a meta-
physics that can elucidate a non-causal relation of composition between 
the emergent macroscopic whole and its microscopic parts. Hylomorphic 
Pluralism provides such a model.
4.2.3.  Substantial Forms
Hylomorphic Pluralism affirms the existence of a variety of substances 
in nature which are metaphysically prior to their physical parts. These 
substance are not built of entities which possess intrinsic physical natures 
apart from the substances of which they are parts. Rather, their material, 
spatially defined parts are ontologically dependent for their causal pow-
ers, and hence their physical natures, upon the wholes of which they are 
parts. Hylomorphic Pluralism, I suggest, can make sense of the existence 
of wholes with ‘emergent’ macroscopic causal powers.
In the first place, Hylomorphic Pluralism offers an alternative account 
of composition to microphysical reductionism. In this model, a macro-
scopic entity which has irreducible causal powers is not an arrangement 
of microphysical constituents which have their own intrinsic physical 
natures. Rather, this entity is metaphysically composed of both mat-
ter (which has no intrinsic causal powers) and substantial form (which 
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determines the powers of the substance): the essential powers of the sub-
stance are metaphysically grounded in its substantial form.
Unlike the Cosmic Hylomorphist, the Hylomorphic Pluralist does not 
posit the existence of a single Cosmic Substance, of which everything else 
in the world is only a part, but admits a plurality of different substances, 
which exist at different physical scales. Among the substances which make 
up the physical world, it may be supposed, are some of the objects of 
ordinary experience that were familiar to the investigations of Aristotle, 
such as plants, animals, and human beings, although I shall leave discus-
sion of the biological world to the next chapter.
In the second place, Hylomorphic Pluralism is able to avoid dualism 
by providing an account of the composition of a metaphysically unified 
whole in which the parts are not themselves substances. In this metaphysi-
cal model, the world is not divided into microscopic entities that have 
quantal properties, on the one hand, and macroscopic entities that have 
classical properties, on the other hand, which somehow interact with 
one another despite being governed by incommensurate laws. Rather, we 
can think of the (inorganic) world as being made of thermal substances 
which have both quantal and classical properties, as Koons and I have 
suggested elsewhere (Koons, 2019; Simpson, 2019), which are metaphysi-
cally composed of matter and substantial form. A thermal substance, 
on this view, is not a unified and fundamental physical whole because 
it micromanages its microphysical parts by pushing them around, and 
the relation between its substantial form and its material parts is not an 
(efficient) causal relation. Rather, the substantial form is the formal cause 
of the unity of the substance by determining the powers of its parts, and 
the relation between the substantial form of the substance and its material 
parts is one of metaphysical grounding.
Unlike the Cosmic Hylomorphist, the Hylomorphic Pluralist does not 
conceive of physical substances as existing in a state of causal isolation, 
but allows substances to interact with one another through the exercise 
of their causal powers. A substance therefore has an accidental form, in 
addition to its substantial form, which is subject to change as it interacts 
with other substances.51 The causal powers through which one substance 
interacts with another substance depend jointly upon both its substantial 
form and its accidental forms.
I shall outline briefly how this hylomorphic metaphysics might be 
applied to a contextual approach to quantum mechanics, whilst restrict-
ing the scope of this toy model to thermal phenomena. According to this 
metaphysical model, the physical world is ‘tiled’ with thermal substances 
which have intrinsic causal powers,52 such that any change in the physi-
cal world necessarily involves a change in one or more of these physical 
substances, which is brought about through the exercise of their causal 
powers. The matter of a substance Si is a parcel of gunk mi(x,t).
53 The 
matter-fields of two substances Si and Sj are distinct from one another in 
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virtue of the prior distinctness of their two parcels of gunk mi(x,t) and 
mj(x,t); they do not share any metaphysical parts. The metaphysical sub-
strate from which physical substances are carved lacks any intrinsic causal 
powers: it only has the potential to bear causal powers. A parcel of matter-
density must be combined with a substantial form to compose a physical 
substance. A parcel of matter-density which – per impossibile – were not 
combined with a substantial form would be a ‘compositional zombie’ that 
lacked any causal powers. When substances interact with one another by 
exercising their causal powers, they exchange matter-density with each 
other’s matter-fields.
We may think of a substance as having an internal matter flow which is 
choreographed by a wave function via the matter-field equation (7). The 
wave function evolves according to a non-linear Schrödinger equation 
(10), where the non-linear terms depend on the macroscopic context in 
which the substance is situated. There is no universal wave function in this 
model: it is only possible to define a wave function in those circumstances 
in which the system has been isolated from the noise of its environment 
and its boundary conditions are relatively stable. The laws in this model 
are thus ‘dappled’ laws (to use Cartwright’s nomenclature), since they are 
not universal regularities but are restricted to the ‘nomological machine’ 
constructed by the experimentalist (Cartwright, 1999). However, the 
Hylomorphic Pluralist is committed to a realist approach to quantum 
mechanics: the wave function governed by the non-linear Schrödinger 
equation represents a real power of the substance to regulate its own 
parcel of matter, which is grounded in its substantial form.54 We might 
think of this power as a multi-track power, where each track corresponds 
to a different macroscopic context.
In addition to having a power to regulate their own parcels of matter, 
the thermal substances comprising the environment of any quantum 
system have causal powers to bring about changes in the matter of other 
substances. These macro-level powers of the substance are sustained 
in existence by the micro-level parts of the substance. The matter of a 
thermal substance, however, does not relate to space and time merely 
as a set of discrete physical units, and the macroscopic properties of a 
thermal substance at a particular time are not reducible to the spatial 
arrangement of its matter at a particular time: the material parts of the 
substance also ‘cooperate’ with one another over time as an undivided 
continuum, generating dynamical situations which can only be modelled 
using Hamiltonian functions defined on an infinite (continuum) model, 
cf. Koons (2019) and Simpson (2019). The proper way of taking this 
limit for a given substance (that is, the correct choice of physical repre-
sentation) is determined by the substantial form of the substance, which 
confers a monadic nature upon the substance as a whole and grounds 
the powers of its micro-level parts.
From Quantum Physics to Metaphysics 55
The Hylomorphic Pluralist is committed to a realist approach to the 
macroscopic properties of physical substances, but one that resists micro-
physical reduction: each thermal substance has a Hilbert-space represen-
tation that defines macroscopic observables for its emergent properties, 
but different substances admit different representations. The macroscopic 
properties of a thermal substance cannot be explained mechanically in 
terms of laws that connect one set of microscopic properties instanti-
ated at time t with another set of microscopic properties at time t´ > 
t, where these microscopic properties are defined in terms of a unique 
representation which characterises the total state of the physical world. 
Nonetheless, there is no need to suppose that the macroscopic powers 
of thermal substances demand new fundamental forces (or non-physical 
‘configuration forces’) in order to make a causal difference to where their 
matter ends up, since the quantum dynamics is context-dependent and the 
macroscopic properties of thermal substances play a role in defining the 
Hilbert spaces and time scales within which the unitary time evolution of 
quantum systems takes place.
The Hylomorphic Pluralist, unlike the effective realist, can thus steer 
a course between pragmatic empiricism and microphysical reductionism. 
On the one hand, the Hylomorphic Pluralist can agree with the prag-
matic empiricist about the disconnect between the explanatory power of 
a theory and the universal truth of its description, whilst maintaining an 
attitude of ontological commitment. Quantum theories are not successful 
because they uncover a single set of microscopic constituents of which 
everything is made, but because they isolate certain causal powers of 
substances which manifest under certain conditions. These causal powers 
are real properties of different thermal substances, but they are metaphysi-
cally grounded in their substantial forms.
On the other hand, the Hylomorphic Pluralist can agree with the micro-
physicalist that the thermodynamic limit is an idealisation, without aban-
doning an ontological commitment to the reality of macroscopic entities. 
Quantum theories about finite temperature systems are not successful 
because they truthfully represent the degrees of freedom in a physical 
system but because their different representations capture something of 
the different ways in which their material parts cooperate in determining 
the thermal properties of a system. These properties are real properties 
of thermal substances, which are grounded in their substantial forms. 
The necessity of adopting a change in the physical representation of a 
system – when it undergoes a phase transition, for example – is due to 
the occurrence of a substantial change taking place in the system,55 which 
is a discontinuous change in which the microscopic powers of a parcel of 
matter are redetermined by a different substantial form.
The Hylomorphic Pluralist, like the effective realist, affirms the existence 
of entities which exist at different physical scales, but remains committed 
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to a fundamental ontology of substances which are metaphysically com-
posed of matter and form. Matter and form are affirmed for the sake of 
both empirical and explanatory adequacy, rather than being read off the 
formalism of quantum physics or isolated in a scientific experiment. We 
can only reach them by metaphysical abstraction in the context of an 
empirical inquiry that affirms the reality of change (Section 2.2). Like the 
people in Plato’s cave, we find ourselves unable to look directly at the 
forms, which cast shadows on the wall of our cave. Unlike the situation 
in Plato’s cave, however, these forms are immanent within substances 
which we can manipulate within different scientific practices, and they 
cast different shadows depending on how they are manipulated. The role 
of the metaphysician is like that of someone who infers the shape of an 
object from the variety of shadows that it projects as it is held to the light 
in different ways.
5.  Concluding Remarks
At the beginning of this chapter, I observed that the Aristotelian concept 
of causal powers, which was widely rejected during the Scientific Revolu-
tion, is now at the forefront of contemporary philosophical discussions. 
In the course of this chapter, I have argued that it also time to reclaim 
the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism. By restoring the concept of 
substantial form, it is possible to provide a realist account of quantum 
physics in terms of an ontology of powers.
The two hylomorphic models which I have discussed correspond to two 
incompatible versions of quantum mechanics: Cosmic Hylomorphism 
offers an ontological account of Bohmian mechanics, which attributes 
the cosmos a universal wave function and a global configuration of par-
ticles (Section 3); Hylomorphic Pluralism offers an ontological account of 
CWC theory, which divides the world into separate parcels of gunk and 
requires the wave function of quantum mechanics to collapse (Section 
4). Granted the unitarian doctrine of substantial form, which Aquinas 
affirmed and Scotus rejected, the ontologies of these models would seem 
to be mutually exclusive: if there is a Cosmic Substance, of which every 
particle is a part, there can be no thermal substances, on pain of violating 
the unity of the Cosmic Substance – unless the thermal substances could 
be embedded in a Cosmic Substance without being mereological parts of 
it (cf. Dumsday, 2016). We might think of the cosmos as beginning as a 
single substance, from which macroscopic thermal substances are subse-
quently derived.56 There is scope here for developing a neo-Aristotelian 
cosmology.
Both of my metaphysical models, I suggest, also hold interest for con-
temporary discussions of theology and science, although each of them 
has its limitations. Cosmic Hylomorphism opens the prospect of reviv-
ing something like the neo-Platonic conception of a ‘world soul’, which 
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could play a role in a scientifically informed account of special divine 
action that is able to resist common objections (Dumsday, 2019a). The 
global perspective of Cosmic Hylomorphism, however, encounters dif-
ficulties in explaining the emergence of specific physical entities, which 
a localist perspective like Hylomorphic Pluralism can readily accom-
modate. Although the sketch of Hylomorphic Pluralism that I have 
offered in this chapter only includes thermal substances, the following 
chapter shows how to extend this account to include biological as well 
as inorganic entities, gaining the explanatory advantage of being able 
to include human beings within nature as embodied and responsible 
agents, created in imago dei.
In putting forward these two hylomorphic models, however, I do 
not wish to suggest that the quantum theories for which they offer 
ontologies are without their difficulties or theoretical costs: Bohmian 
mechanics only secures agreement with the Born rule of standard quan-
tum mechanics via the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which has been 
criticised for being ‘artificial’ (Valentini, 2019); CWC theory rejects 
the theory of decoherence, a theory many physicists find appealing. 
Both Bohmian mechanics and CWC theory come at the cost of denying 
Lorentz invariance, sacrificing an observational symmetry of special 
relativity.
Whether these are perceived as theoretical costs, and if so, just how they 
will be weighed against one another, will vary among both philosophers 
and physicists. Some physicists – particularly mathematical theorists – are 
strongly attracted to simplicity and symmetry, although such an attrac-
tion is not without its perils, since it can lead to physical models that are 
oversimplified or are endowed with symmetries that do not appear to 
correspond to anything in reality. Other physicists – perhaps the more 
practically minded experimentalists – may be sympathetic to some degree 
of dappledness in nature’s laws.
In any case, I do not wish to suggest that Bohmian mechanics and CWC 
theory are the only quantum mechanical theories which admit hylomor-
phic models. Adrian Kent has proposed a way of solving the measure-
ment problem that does not entail a rejection of decoherence theory and 
which may admit a hylomorphic interpretation (Kent, 2015).57 Alexander 
R. Pruss has offered a hylomorphic account of quantum mechanics that 
adapts the so-called travelling minds interpretation (Pruss, 2017). There 
are doubtless other areas for exploration.
Before closing, I should emphasise that the two metaphysical mod-
els that I have outlined in this chapter are not simple restorations of 
Aristotle’s original doctrine of hylomorphism: the matter they posit is 
not merely a substrate of potentiality but consists of particles or par-
cels of gunk which play a role in individuating physical objects, and 
the notion of formal causation is explicated in terms of a grounding 
relation. These are features which may attract the censure of classical 
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Aristotelians or Thomists. I am offering these ‘neo-Aristotelian’ models, 
however, as philosophical sketches which are intended to inspire further 
discussion.58
Notes
1. The term ‘hylomorphism’ is a portmanteau of these Greek words.
2. Widespread, but not universal: Leibniz was a notable exception to this trend 
(Leibniz, 1976).
3. Physicists have often denied the intelligibility of quantum mechanics (Dürr 
et al., 2012, ch. 4).
4. Anna Marmodoro has expounded its Aristotelian roots by linking the concept 
to Aristotle’s discussion of potentiality and actuality (Marmodoro, 2014, ch. 1).
5. For a recent discussion of the return of powers to mainstream philosophy, see 
Lagerlund et al. (2021).
6. Famously, in Raphael’s School of Athens, Plato is portrayed pointing a finger 
upward toward the sky, whilst one of Aristotle’s hand is stretched toward the 
earth with his fingers splayed.
7. For a discussion of universals in Plato and Aristotle, see Scaltsas (1994).
8. See Plato’s Sophist in (Cooper, 1997, 247d-e, 269).
9. In my references to Aristotle, I am relying upon Barnes (1984).
10. That is, according to how Aristotle has generally been understood. For an 
alternative reading, in which Aristotle is fundamentally committed to powers 
(or power tropes), see Marmodoro (2014).
11. That is, in virtue of their having animal forms, or souls.
12. See e.g. [Arist., Gen. & Corr., I.10] in Barnes (1984); in particular, 327b23–
b33. Also, [Arist., Metaphys., b5–15 & 1040b5–15].
13. For further discussion of integral wholes and potential parts, see Simons 
(2000, ch. 9).
14. According to Aquinas, in De Principiis Naturae (following the translation in 
Skrzypek, 2019): ‘Matter and form are said to be intrinsic to a thing, in that 
they are parts constituting that thing’ (ch. 3); ‘matter and form are said to be 
related to one another . . . they are also said to be related to the composite as 
parts to a whole and as that which is simple to that which is composite’ (ch. 
4). For a contemporary account of forms as metaphysical parts of substances, 
see Koslicki (2008, 2018).
15. For a more detailed narrative about the physicalisation of matter and form, 
see Pasnau (2011). Sections 2.3 and 2.4 also draw upon parts of a previously 
published paper of mine concerning the fall and rise of hylomorphism, and 
some sentences are verbatim (Simpson, 2018).
16. Following Pasnau’s discussion in Pasnau (2011).
17. [Burgersdijk, F. 1650, Collegium Physicum, II.34, pp. 1314], as translated in 
Pasnau (2011).
18. For a discussion of Ockham’s view, see Pasnau (2011), ‘Matter and extension’.
19. See [Scotus, Rep. II.12.2 n. 7 (XI:322b)] in Wolter and Bychkov (2004).
20. See [Dabillon 1643, Physique, I. 3.2, p. 103] as cited in Pasnau (2011).
21. William de la Mare targeted Aquinas affirmation of unicity in Correctorium 
Fratris Thomae in 1279.
22. [Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, 15.1.7] as quoted in Pasnau (2011). 
The text is somewhat ambiguous.
23. A Scotist might seek to develop a response to my physicalisation argument in 
which some instances of causation could count as being efficient and formal, 
rather than having to count as one or the other.
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24. From C. Adam and P. Tannery eds., Oeuvres de Descartes, rev. ed., 12 vols. 
(Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964–76), as quotes and translated in Pasnau (2011).
25. See René Descartes to Morin, 12 September 1638, in The Philosophical Writ-
ings of Descartes, vol. 3, ed. J. Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).
26. Significantly, Newton rejected the claim that a physical explanation had to 
trace everything down to the motion of the smallest corpuscles. His theory 
of universal gravitation afforded a physical explanation even though it did 
not describe what push or pull between corpuscles caused gravitational 
phenomena.
27. See R. Boyle, The Origin of Forms and Qualities, in The Works of Robert 
Boyle, ed. M. Hunter and E. Davis (London: Pickering & Chatto, 1999–2000).
28. H. Oldenburg, Correspondence, ed. and trans. A.R. Hall and M.B. Hall 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), III:67.
29. See Works of Boyle, V:305.
30. I have not space here to address Newton’s changing views on powers, or 
Thomas Reid’s defence of dispositionalism against Hume, etc. For a more 
adequate historical account, see Lagerlund et al. (2021).
31. See P.-S. Marquie de Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, trans. 
F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1902).
32. Section 3 draws upon the hylomorphic interpretation of Bohmian mechanics 
suggested in my doctoral thesis (Simpson, 2019), which was further devel-
oped in Simpson (2021).
33. In Einstein’s original version of the EPR experiment, the measurements are of 
position and momentum.
34. For a more detailed but accessible discussion, see Maudlin (2011).
35. For three recent experimental tests of Bell’s inequalities, which close two 
‘loopholes’ in Bell’s theorem and underscore the failure of locality, see Gius-
tina et al. (2015); Hensen et al. (2015); Shalm et al. (2015).
36. The operator Û is a unitary operator. The meaning of ‘unitarity’ is that the proba-
bilities computed from ψ always sum to unity. The operator Û redistributes 
the probabilities between different possibilities as time goes on. It also induces 
superpositions.
37. Maudlin admits that besides GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics, ‘there 
are others that can survive the test’ (Maudlin, 1995, p. 14). I discuss a third 
possibility called CWC theory in Section 4, which is like GRW theory except 
that the wave function collapse dynamics is context-dependent.
38. The particles are each attributed gravitational mass, mi, but the COW 
experiment suggests mass delocalises over the wave function and need not be 
regarded as an intrinsic property (Brown, 1996). (COW refers to the scien-
tists: Colella, Overhauser and Werner.)
39. Concerning relativistic versions of Bohmian mechanics, see Dürr et al. 
(2014).
40. Since the theory allows non-equilibrium solutions ρ ψ≠ 2 , this restriction 
to quantum equilibrium has generally been taken as a necessary postulate to 
introduce the element of randomness that is essential to quantum mechanics 
(Dürr et al., 1992). Some see this move as ‘artificial’, e.g. Valentini (2019).
41. For details of this account of laws, see Ramsey (1978), Lewis (1973, 
pp. 73–75), Lewis (1987, postscript), and Mill (1875, Book III Chapter IV).
42. For further discussion, see Lazarovici (2018), Matarese (2018), Simpson 
(2020), and Wilson (2018).
43. This model deploys the notion of grounding championed in Schaffer (2009, 
2010).
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44. Concerning the nature of this substantial unity, see Simpson (2021, Section 3) 
and Peterson (2018).
45. Section 4 draws upon my hylomorphic interpretation of contextual wave 
function collapse theory in my doctoral work (Simpson, 2019).
46. This section discusses a problem I describe at greater length in (Simpson et 
al. in progress).
47. This technique maintains the tradition of using separable Hilbert spaces in 
quantum mechanics.
48. In statistical physics, classical models of coupled spins (like Glauber models) 
are also used which show phase transitions for finite systems. These mod-
els have flip rates that depend on the orientation of their neighbours. With 
increasing system size, however, the time required for flipping the preferred 
orientation becomes larger than the lifetime of the universe. So for all practi-
cal purposes, ergodicity is broken and different phases coexist. I would like 
to thank Barbara Drossel for pointing this out.
49. Cf. Brian Ellis’s causal process realism (Ellis, 2001, pp. 157–160).
50. Of course, this is only a simplified example of what this feedback might look 
like. The final equation in an elaborated theory of feedback will look more 
complicated and will involve stochasticity.
51. For a discussion of accidental forms as metaphysical parts of material sub-
stances, see Skrzypek (2019).
52. Regarding the ‘tiling constraint’, see Schaffer (2010). See also its application 
in Koons (2019).
53. In another version of this model, the gunk might be replaced with infinitely 
divisible ‘extended simples’. For the sake of simplicity and continuity, however, 
I have inherited the gunk from the GRWm ontology.For further discussion of 
material composition and substance ontologies, see Dumsday (2019b, chs. 4–5).
54. On this view, the linear Schrödinger equation familiar to standard quantum 
mechanics is an idealisation that only exists in the limit of perfect isolation f 
→ 0, which cannot be attained in practice.
55. As opposed to an accidental change; the only kind of change admitted in the 
mechanical stance.
56. The Cosmic Substance, in that case, would also be a thermal substance.
57. Correspondence with Robert Verrill.
58. The author would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Thomas Davenport, 
Barbara Drossel, Travis Dumsday, George Ellis, Simon Horsley, Robert C. 
Koons, Anna Marmodoro, John Pemberton, Javier Sanchez-Canizares, and 
Robert Verrill, among other friends and colleagues too numerous to name, for 
critical feedback and discussions.
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